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Introduction
On June 21st, last year, the Council of Ministers of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (the "OECD"), representing the
non-Communist industrial countries of Europe, North America 'and Japan,
adopted a Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises. All members of the OECD, including the United States and excluding
only Turkey, were signatories to the Declaration.
The Declaration is actually a package of agreements consisting primarily of a
set of "guidelines for Multinational Enterprises," and Declarations and Deci-
sions on "National Treatment and Incentives and Disincentives for Interna-
tional Investment." Under the National Treatment Declaration, member
countries recognize their obligation not to discriminate with regard to treatment
of foreign-owned enterprises in their territory. With regard to Incentives and
Disincentives to International Investment, member countries have agreed to act
to minimize the adverse effects of various unilateral national acts constituting
incentives or disincentives to international investment. The Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises establish consensus standards of good conduct for all
multinational enterprises ("MNEs"), private, state-owned or mixed, which
operate in OECD countries. They also apply, where relevant, to domestic
countries. They cover in substantial detail major aspects of multinational enter-
prise activities including those relating to their general corporate policies,
information disclosure, competition, financing, taxation, employment tech-
nology and improper payments.
*B.A. Magna Cum Laude, Williams College, LL.B. Cambridge University, England; J.D., Yale
University. Mr. Plaine is a member of the firm of Steptoe and Johnson.
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Background
The OECD declaration, decisions and guidelines were several years in the
making. One initial catalyst was the United States reaction to the Canadian
government's luring of a new French Michelin Tire Company plant with a
package of extraordinary tax and investment incentives. The United States
objected to the Canadian incentives as a form of subsidy which would require us
to impose countervailing duties if continued.
Before the OECD had begun to focus on the issues of incentives, disincen-
tives and discrimination, a number of developments shifted the emphasis of
international interest to that of setting ground rules for multinationals. Codes of
conduct for multinational companies were proposed in a nuniber of interna-
tional organizations, including, besides the OECD, the Organization of
American States (the OAS) and the United Nations.
The United States opted for the negotiation of the OECD code first, rather
than an OAS or a U.N. code, on the implicit assumption that the standards for
corporate conduct acceptable to most or all industrialized nations of the OECD
would be far more palatable than those acceptable to the less developed
countries in the U.N. or the OAS. In other words, the OECD was the most
favorable forum available. The OECD agreements should constitute a common
bargaining position of the industrialized countries in the progress of negotia-
tions on codes of conduct in the U.N.
Another incentive for negotiation of the guidelines in the OECD was to use
these negotiations to obtain OECD recognition of the view that United States
and other foreign companies operating abroad ought to be given "national
treatment," and that the OECD would accept the proposition that both govern-
ments and multinationals have responsibilities to each other.
Now that we have agreed to the Guidelines, will they have any significance for
individual clients or to multinational companies generally? The answer is
probably affirmative. Most companies with any substantial operations abroad
will almost certainly find themselves obliged to study the Guidelines, to review
their corporate practices to see that they are in conformity with the Guidelines,
and to justify to many foreign governments, perhaps even to the United States
government, any departures from them. For these reasons, an abbreviated
description of some of the more significant provisions of the Guidelines would
appear to be in order.
The Guidelines' Provisions
First and of great importance, the Guidelines explicitly do not impose man-
datory obligations upon companies. They are "voluntary and not legally en-
forceable."' Nevertheless, they are presented as "recommendations jointly
'Guidelines' Introduction 1 6.
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addressed by member countries to multinational enterprises operating in their
territories" 2 as to the standards of good conduct for all enterprises.
On improper payments, the Guidelines proscribe bribes or other direct or
indirect improper benefits to any government officials, or unless legally per-
mitted, contributions to candidates for public office or political parties. They
also require abstention from "any improper involvement in local political
activities. ' '
The Guidelines contain a section on Competition, prohibiting generally
abuses of dominant positions and in not very clear terms imposing restrictions
on intra-company pricing. 4 The Competition section also requires that a
company give maximum freedom to its purchasers, distributors and licensees
with regard to resales, exports, purchases and general development of their
operations,' and that enterprises should "refrain from participating in or
otherwise purposely strengthening the restrictive effects of international or
domestic cartels or restrictive agreements which adversely affect or eliminate
competition. . . -. As originally drafted, this latter provision would have pro-
hibited acts of cooperation with or acts which led to the strengthening of cartels,
and thus, for example, might even have prohibited investments in oil produc-
tion in OPEC countries to the extent that they might contribute to the strength-
ening of the OPEC oil cartel. For this reason, the provision was rewritten in
terms of "participating in or otherwise purposely strengthening." As with the
standards relating to "abuse of dominant position," however, these standards
in the Competition section do not reflect the precise words or standards used in
United States law, and might have a different impact from our prohibitions,
such as on conspiracies in restraint of trade. It should be noted also that the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice participated actively in the
drafting of this provision, and the Competition section generally meets with its
implicit approval.
With regard to Financing, the Guidelines provide that enterprises, "in
managing the financial and commercial operations of their activities, and
especially their liquid foreign assets and liabilities, [should] take into
consideration the established objectives of the countries in which they operate
regarding balance of payments and credit policies." 7 It remains to be seen
whether this provision might be invoked to require companies to make
uneconomic investments or funds transfers in order to contribute to a picture of
a healthy balance of payments for a particular country.
'Loc. cit.
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In the Employment and Industrial Relations section of the Guidelines,
discrimination in the employment of promotion of personnel with respect to
nationality is prohibited except to the extent that discrimination-most likely in
favor of nationals of the host country-is required by domestic law. 8 The
Guidelines establish the general standard that enterprises should "respect the
right of their employees to be represented by trade unions" and should "engage
in constructive negotiations ... with such employee organizations. . ... ,
Enterprises are also required, during the course of labor negotiations, not to
"threaten to utilize the capacity to transfer the whole or part of an operating
unit from the company concerned in order to influence unfairly those
negotiations . . . 0 In the context of another provision of the labor relations
section by which enterprises are required to give reasonable notice of substantial
or drastic changes involving layoffs or a transfer of investment from the country,
it may be that an enterprise will be faced with the dilemma of violating the
Guidelines if it gives labor fair warning of layoffs or a shift in investment, and
violating the Guidelines if it doesn't.
The Guidelines contain a section on Science and Technology which provides
rather vaguely for the "diffusion" of new technology throughout the world. It
requires that "when granting licenses for the use of industrial property rights or
when otherwise transferring technology [companies] do so on reasonable terms
and conditions." I" Interpretation of what is "reasonable" will obviously lead to
a number of quite interesting disputes in the future.
The requirements contained in the Guidelines with respect to Disclosure of
Information will have perhaps the greatest immediate impact on most
companies. These disclosure requirements permeate the entire Guidelines.
Under a separate Disclosure of Information section, enterprises are obliged to
publish "information . . . as a supplement . . . to information to be disclosed
under the national law of the individual countries in which they operate,"
including financial statements, information relating to the structure of the
enterprise, ... the identification of affiliates,12 operating results, sales and
significant new capital investment both by major lines of business and by
geographic area,' 3 "a statement of the sources and uses of funds by the
enterprise as a whole," 4 the average number of employees in each geographical
area, ," "research and development expenditure for the enterprise as a whole,""6




"Science and Technology 1 3.
"Disclosure of Information I i.
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and "the policies followed in respect of intra-group pricing."I 7 A major source
of debate with regard to disclosure of information was the requirement of
disclosure of operating results, sales, investment and employment by
geographic area. A number of OECD countries such as Sweden pressed for the
requirement that companies publish all financial and operating data, broken
down on a country-by-country basis. In the final draft of the Guidelines,
however, this requirement was modified by defining "geographical area" as
either "groups of countries or individual countries as each enterprise determines
it appropriate in its particular circumstances."' 18
It should be noted that these geographic areas and country-by-country
disclosure requirements may be governed for United States companies by new
reporting standards under consideration in the United States. You are probably
aware of proposals now before the Financial Accounting Standards Board
which would require a corporation to break down its financial statements not
only by industry, but also with respect to its foreign operations and its foreign
sales by groups of countries or individual countries in which the enterprise has
significant operations.
The OECD Guidelines provide for additional obligations of disclosure in
substantive sections of the code, including, among others, the requirements that
they "provide to representatives of employees information which is needed for
meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment,"' 9 "provide to
representatives of employees . . . information which enables them to obtain a
true and fair view of the performance of the entity or ... enterprise as a
whole," 2 0 and cooperate with and provide information to host country authorities
on competition issues and investigations."
Impact on Multinational Enterprises
Notwithstanding their so-called voluntary nature, the Guidelines cannot be
ignored. In fact, enterprises would probably make serious mistakes if they were
to act contrary to the Guidelines or not seek positively to abide by them. A
number of reasons are immediately suggested.
The first is for good public and governmental relations. The Guidelines have
been the subject of several years of discussion, over a year of formal negotiations
and a great deal of input by the business community. Although not specifically
endorsed by the private sector, it could be considered to be an act of bad faith
for business to have participated in negotiations, albeit indirectly, to have many
"Ibid., I viii.
"Ibid., ii, fn.
"Employment and Industrial Relations I 12(b).
"Ibid., J 3.
"Competition 4.
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of its suggestions accepted by the negotiators, and then to walk away from the
result. Perhaps more important, these Guidelines have been accepted by every
major Western industrial country as the embodiment of "standards of good
conduct," both for private multinational enterprises and for national
companies. It would hardly suit most companies to act in a manner blatantly
inconsistent with what appears to be a consensus as to good corporate behavior.
Proceeding one step further, the Guidelines may transcend considerations of
public and governmental relations and may be indicative of the future trend of
international law. It is, of course, academic that enforceability is not necessarily
the test of what constitutes international law. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, sources of international law include not only treaties embodying
express regulations, but also "the customs and usages of civilized nations."2
The Guidelines, notwithstanding their voluntary nature, are proclaimed to
embody standards of good conduct universally recognized among the Western
industrial countries.
This is not to say that companies can be called to task by international
tribunals for their failure to comply with the Guidelines. On the contrary, when
questions arise with respect to the application of the Guidelines to a particular
enterprise, the Guidelines specifically provide that the enterprise be given the
opportunity, if it so wishes, to express its views to the OECD, but that the
OECD "shall not reach conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises. '"23
Nevertheless, national tribunals or decision-makers may wish to compare
individual company conduct with standards contained in the Guidelines.
For example, multinational clients should probably be advised that within the
next few months or years, they may be confronted with a number of requests by
foreign governments that they indicate adherence to or compliance with the
Guidelines. There is certainly nothing to stop countries from making part or all
of the Guidelines part of national law or regulation. Moreover, the impact of the
Guidelines may be felt even in the United States. Let me suggest a few
hypotheticals:
* If a lawyer's client-company is faced by what appear to be unreasonable
penalties, or restrictions, or even expropriation or confiscation abroad, we
normally can seek the intervention of our own government. If it appears that the
client has not complied with the Guidelines in the country in which the dispute
has arisen, it is predictable that the United States government might find it
quite awkward to advocate the views and interests of a particular client or to
intervene on its behalf.
2 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also article 38 of the statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
"Decision of the Council on Inter-governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises J 3.
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* Many corporate clients also seek to protect their new investments through
insurance. It would be a nice question of interpretation of insurance policies as
to whether a company could lose its insurability in any country in which it has
violated the provisions of the Guidelines.
* Many companies also obtain some of their financing through the Export
Import Bank, the International Finance Corporation or other international
financial sources. Again, it would not be at all a surprise to find these
institutions extremely reluctant to lend funds to any companies which are acting
in violation of the Guidelines.
The most important reason for adherence to the Guidelines is the advantage
to business of a recognized standard of conduct for both multinationals and
governments. As previously observed, the Guidelines are actually one
component of an overall package. Much of the package imposes obligations
upon governments as well as companies; and most of these obligations on
governments are to the distinct advantage of international companies-advan-
tages which they should keep in mind when they are faced with various new re-
strictions, impositions or other requirements which they consider to be unduly
burdensome or unreasonable. For example, The Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises providing for "National Treatment"
provides:
[T]hat Member countries should . . . accord to enterprises operating in their territories
and owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of another member country
... treatment under their laws, regulations and administrative practices, consistent
with international law and no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to
domestic enterprises."
This National Treatment Declaration constitutes acceptance by every major
free-world industrial country of the principle that foreign companies should be
treated without discrimination, and in addition, that they should be treated
according to international law. By this provision and by the broad definition of
enterprises, even in circumstances where state-owned governmental companies
are involved, foreign companies operating with the territory of that country are
now proclaimed to be entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment.
In sum, the Guidelines impose some significant de facto obligations on
companies doing business abroad. Most are fairly reasonable, some could be
confusing and others could possibly become quite onerous. In the context of the
broader package, however, it certainly will be more difficult for countries to
build new barriers to foreign trade or investment, and provide a basis for
rebuilding relations between multinational companies and the public. These
possibilities, of improving the battered images of our companies and of
obtaining fairer treatment abroad, should be well worth the obligations of
2 Declaration, II.
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complying with the Guidelines' standards of good conduct.
In this connection, attention should be directed not only to the Guidelines but
also to the proposed resolution of the ABA International Law Section's
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, by which the American Bar
Association:
[Clommends the OECD Declaration to its members for their consideration as its provi-
sions affect activities of their clients, endorses the Declaration and the Guidelines in
particular as a balanced, reciprocal and voluntary statement on applicable standards
of conduct which should guide the position of United States representatives in dis-
cussion of these subjects in other international fora, and expresses its approval of the
open and constructive process by which the United States delegation negotiating the
OECD Declaration consulted with the private sector during these negotiations.
International Lawyer, VoL 11, No. 2
